Imports as product and labour market discipline by Boulhol, H. et al.
Imports as product and labour market discipline∗
Herve´ BOULHOL†
Sabien DOBBELAERE‡
Sara MAIOLI§
May 2008
Abstract
This paper tests the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade in the product
and labour markets of UK manufacturing sectors between 1988 and 2003
using a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we use data on
9820 firms from twenty manufacturing sectors to simultaneously estimate
mark-up and workers’ bargaining power parameters according to sector,
firm size and period. We find a significant drop in both the mark-up and
the workers’ bargaining power in the mid-nineties. In the second stage,
we relate our parameters of interest to trade variables. Our results show
that imports from developed countries have significantly contributed to
the decrease in both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power.
JEL classification : C23, F16, J51, L13.
Keywords : Workers’ bargaining power, mark-ups, pro-competitive eﬀect.
1 Introduction
Investigating the impact of foreign competition on price-marginal cost mark-
ups is a prominent topic in the trade literature. In particular for the UK,
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), Geroski (1981, 1982) and Conyon andMachin (1991)
show evidence of the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis, i.e. the negative
impact of foreign competition on mark-ups, using sector data. Following Levin-
sohn’s 1993 (JIE) article, many firm-level studies have drawn on Hall’s (1988)
∗We are grateful to Daniel S. Hamermesh, Jacques Mairesse, Daniel Mirza, Giuseppe Nico-
letti and other participants at the Conference of the European Association for Research in
Industrial Economics (Amsterdam, 2006) and the IZA/SOLE Transatlantic Meeting of Labor
Economists (Buch, 2008) for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours.
†Universite´ Paris-Panthe´on Sorbonne, OECD.
‡Ghent University, K.U.Leuven, IZA Bonn. Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Founda-
tion - Flanders (FWO). Corresponding author: Sabien.Dobbelaere@UGent.be
§Newcastle University Business School.
1
approach to estimate price-marginal cost mark-ups and have provided support
for the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis (see Harrison, 1994; Krishna
and Mitra, 1998; Konings et al., 2001; Kee and Hoekman, 2007 among others).
However, Hall’s (1988) method relies on perfect labour markets. Focusing on
the labour side and inspired by Rodrik’s (1997) argument that increased inter-
national trade weakens the position of the workers, only two studies (Brock and
Dobbelaere, 2006 and Dumont et al., 2006) have directly investigated whether
stronger import competition squeezes workers’ bargaining power.1 Dumont et
al. (2006) find a negative impact using firm-level data covering five European
countries, whereas Brock and Dobbelaere (2006) do not for Belgium. Using an
extension of a microeconomic version of Hall’s (1988) framework proposed by
Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002) to take into account labour market imperfections,
our main contribution is to provide evidence of international competition cur-
tailing domestic market power in the product market as well as in the labour
market for UK manufacturing sectors. This is the first study that addresses
both issues and that focuses on the UK using firm-level data.2
Graph 1 displays the evolution in price-cost margins at the UK sector level
since 1970.3 At first sight, there is little evidence of a general decline in price-
cost margins despite a steady increase in openness. In fact, at the aggregated
manufacturing level, the price-cost margin was 9.4% in 1970, 8.2% in 1980,
11.5% in 1990 and 9.2% in 2003. How could we reconcile these trends with the
evidence of the pro-competitive eﬀect of international trade highlighted above?
In short, the eﬀect of trade on the price-cost margin is not limited to its impact
on the mark-up, because the price-cost margin only captures the part of the
rents kept by the firms. Price-cost margins are therefore negatively related to
the workers’ bargaining power and a weakening of the workers’ bargaining power
may counterbalance, at least partly, a decrease in markups.
<Insert Graph 1 about here>
Taking into account labour market imperfections, Borjas and Ramey (1995)
provide evidence of foreign competition exerting a negative impact on wages by
reducing rents in concentrated sectors. However, the finding of lower rents per
se does not mean that the rent-sharing scheme between capital and labour has
changed. The seminal paper by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) draws attention
to the importance of product and labour market interactions. Moreover, OECD
studies (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005) point out that product and labour market
deregulations are correlated across countries. Going one step further, Ebell and
Haefke (2006), endogenising the bargaining regime, argue that the strong decline
1Abowd and Lemieux (1993) showed indirectly that foreign competition has an impact on
workers’ bargaining power by firstly linking the size of the rents to foreign competition and
secondly the bargaining power to the size of the rents.
2Dumont et al. (2006) include the UK among the five countries but their sample is much
smaller and they focus on the labour market only.
3Price-cost margin is defined, as in Schmalensee (1989, p.960), as the diﬀerence between
revenue and variable cost over revenue. The variable cost is the sum of the costs of variable
inputs, i.e. labour and materials.
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in coverage and unionisation in the US and the UK might have been a direct
consequence of product market reforms of the early eighties. Boulhol (2006)
develops a theoretical model formalising the idea that capital market and trade
liberalization put pressure on labour market institutions leading to deregulation.
Studying the UK in the eighties and nineties, Pencavel (2004) documents how
the changes in the legal and political framework were undoubtedly detrimental
to unions, but he also stressed that it is the context of fiercer product market
competition which determined the impact of the new laws. Moreover, Hornstein
et al. (2005) suggest that, as union density did not fall in the public sector,
competitive pressure seems to be a reasonable cause of deunionisation in the
UK. According to the empirical analysis herein, the trend in UK price-cost
margins is partially the result of the joint decline in the mark-up and the workers’
bargaining power following the increased openness of the economy.
We contribute to the literature in diﬀerent ways. We take advantage of a rich
firm-level dataset consisting of 9820 firms in the UK manufacturing industry
covering the period 1988-2003. This enables us to estimate mark-up and work-
ers’ bargaining power parameters simultaneously for 20 sectors split according
to 3 firm size categories and 3 time periods. To our knowledge, investigating the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the two parameters at this level of disaggrega-
tion has never been carried out for the UK. Whereas previous empirical studies
have tested the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis either on the product
market or on the labour market, our study bridges the gap by verifying the im-
pact of increased import competition on both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining
power parameters.
We follow a two-stage approach in which we first estimate mark-ups and workers’
bargaining power parameters according to three dimensions (sector, firm size
and time period). Our results point to a significant drop in both parameters
in the mid-nineties. In the second stage, we identify factors explaining mark-
ups and workers’ bargaining power with a special focus on international trade.
We find clear evidence of imports from developed countries having contributed
significantly to the decline in both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power.
In the remainder, we first describe the theoretical framework and the empirical
strategy (section 2). Section 3 concentrates on the first-stage results. Section 4
discusses the second-stage results where we evaluate the pro-competitive eﬀect
on both mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Hall’s (1988) approach for evaluating mark-ups hinges on one crucial assump-
tion, i.e. firms consider input prices as given prior to deciding their level of
inputs. In other words, there is no imperfection in the labour market. However,
there is widespread evidence of rent-sharing, hence the need for a framework
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to bring together imperfect competition in product and labour markets. Theo-
retically, we rely on the model of Cre´pon, Desplatz and Mairesse (1999, 2002),
detailed further by Dobbelaere (2004), which extends Hall’s framework to al-
low for the possibility that wages and employment are bargained over between
firms and workers (eﬃcient bargaining).4 We start from a production function
Qit = ΘitF (Nit, Mit, Kit), where i is a firm index, t a time index, N is labour,
M is material input, K is capital and F (.) is assumed to be homogeneous of
degree one in its arguments. Θit is an index of technical change or “true” total
factor productivity. The logarithmic diﬀerentiation of the production function
gives:
∆qit = εQNit∆nit + ε
Q
Mit∆mit + ε
Q
Kit∆kit +∆θit (1)
Each firm operates under imperfect competition in the product market. On the
labour side, we assume that the union and the firm are involved in an eﬃcient
bargaining procedure with both wages (w) and labour (N) being the subject
of an agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The union’s objective is to
maximize U(wit, Nit) = Nitv(wit) + (N it −Nit)v (wit), where v(.) is increasing
and concave,5 N it is union membership (0 < Nit ≤ N it), wit is the alternative
wage (wit ≤ wit). Consistent with capital quasi-fixity,6 the firm objective is
to maximize its short-run profit function: π(wit, Nit, Mit) = R(Nit, Mit) −
witNit − jitMit, where Rit = PitQit stands for total revenue. The outcome of
the bargaining is the asymmetric Generalised Nash solution to:
max
wit, Nit,Mit
{N itv(wit) + (N it−N it)v (wit)−N itv (wit) }φit {Rit−witNit−jitMit}1−φit
= max
wit, Nit,Mit
{N it(v(wit)− v (wit))}φit {Rit−witNit−jitMit}1−φit (2)
where φit ∈ [0, 1] represents the workers’ bargaining power.
Maximization with respect to material input gives RM,it = jit with RM,it the
marginal revenue of material input, which directly leads to:
εQMit = µitαMit (3)
4One popular alternative to Hall’s methodology is that developed by Roeger (1995). Unfor-
tunately in our precise context, on top of the usual limitations referring either to the intricate
computation of the user cost of capital or the assumption of perfect adjustment of capital,
Roeger’s specification requires mark-ups to be constant over time, an assumption which is
obviously inconsistent with the very purpose of this study. In addition, when introducing
labour market imperfections, e.g. with eﬃcient bargaining, the derived specification (even
if one assumes time-invariant parameters) cannot identify separately the mark-up and the
bargaining power.
5Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2000) assume that workers are risk-neutral. We use a more general
framework.
6Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2000) assume capital quasi-fixity. In their framework, what only
matter is that capital is installed before bargaining takes place, which is a very reasonable
hypothesis. When assuming that capital adjusts perfectly, the quasi-rents that unions target
are lower and therefore a higher bargaining power would be needed empirically to match the
data.
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µit = PitCQ,it refers to the mark-up of price (Pit) over marginal cost (CQ,it) and
αMit =
jitMit
PitQit
. Maximization with respect to employment and the wage rate
respectively gives the following first-order conditions:
wit = RN,it +
φit
1− φit
·
Rit − witNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
(4)
v(wit) = v (wit) +
φit
1− φit
·
Rit − witNit − jitMit
Nit
¸
v
0
(wit) (5)
Eq. (5) states that the wage premium over the alternative wage is positively
related to the workers’ bargaining power and to the size of the rents. Solving
simultaneously (4) and (5) leads to an expression for the contract curve: wit −
RN,it =
v(wit)−v(wit)
v0 (wit)
, which is positively sloped if workers are risk-averse (v00 <
0) and vertical in the (N,w)-space if they are risk-neutral. Expressing the
marginal revenue of labour as RN,it = RQ,itQN,it = PitQN,itµit and using this
expression together with (4), the elasticity of output with respect to employment
can be written as:
εQNit = µitαNit − µit
φit
1− φit
(1− αNit − αMit) (6)
with αNit = witNitPitQit . Assuming constant returns to scale
³
εQNit + ε
Q
Mit + ε
Q
Kit = 1
´
,
the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
εQKit = 1− µitαMit − µitαNit + µit
φit
1− φit
(1− αNit − αMit) (7)
Inserting (3), (6) and (7) in (1) and rearranging terms gives following expression
of the Solow Residual SRit:
SRit ≡ ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1− αNit − αMit)∆kit
= βit (∆qit −∆kit)− γit (1− αNit − αMit) (∆nit −∆kit) (8)
+ (1− βit)∆θit
where βit =
µit−1
µit
is the Lerner index and γit =
φit
1−φit
, strictly increasing
functions of the mark-up and the bargaining power, respectively.
Eq. (8) discriminates between the eﬃcient bargaining and the right-to-manage
model. In the right-to-manage model, although wages are determined non-
competitively, they are given before the firm’s employment decision. Conse-
quently, as in the perfect labour market case, the marginal revenue of labour is
equal to the wage, and firms stay on their labour demand curve. Hence, the null
hypothesis of γit = 0 in Eq. (8) does not only correspond to the assumption
that the labour market is competitive but also to the less restrictive assump-
tion that firms and workers only bargain over wages in a first step and firms
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unilaterally determine their employment level in a second step (right-to-manage
assumption).
By embedding the eﬃcient bargaining model into a microeconomic version of
Hall’s (1988) framework, the Solow Residual can be broken down into three com-
ponents: (1) a factor representing the Lerner index (βit), (2) a factor reflecting
the relative bargaining power of the workers (γit) and (3) a technological term
(∆θit). Note that, as ∆nit and ∆qit are positively correlated, the original Hall
(1988) approach assuming allocative wages, i.e. neglecting the second term,
generates a downward bias in estimated markups. Moreover, this bias increases
with the bargaining power of the workers. Intuitively, this underestimation cor-
responds to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the workers.
Indeed, Cre´pon et al. (1999, 2002) estimate their model with and without the
bargaining term on 1026 French firms over the period 1986-1992. They find
that ignoring labour market imperfections leads to a significant underestima-
tion of the actual mark-up. The bargaining power is estimated at 0.66 and the
average markup at 1.41, compared to 1.11 only when ignoring the incidence of
rent sharing, both being consistent with a Lerner index or price-cost margin of
0.10 (see Dobbelaere, 2004 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2008 for sector-level
evidence in the Belgian and the French manufacturing industry respectively).
2.2 Empirical Framework
To test the imports-as-product-and-labour-market-discipline hypothesis, we fol-
low a two-stage estimation strategy. In the first part, we estimate the reduced-
form equation (8) which allows us to identify our structural parameters of inter-
est, i.e. the price-marginal cost mark-up µˆ and the workers’ bargaining power bφ.
We estimate these parameters for 20 sectors in the UK manufacturing industry,
split according to 3 size categories and 3 time periods. In the second part, our
estimated parameters are regressed on international trade variables to test the
hypothesis that international competition curtails domestic product and labour
market power.
3 Part I : Identifying the parameters of interest
µˆ and bφ
In this section, we first present the data. Second, we outline our empirical
strategy and compare consistently fixed eﬀects (FE) and Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) estimates of our parameters of interest at the sectoral level
for all firms and all periods. Finally, we conduct a variance analysis along the
three dimensions, sector, firm size and period.
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3.1 Data
Our analysis is based on two firm-level surveys: OneSource, which covers the
years 1988-1998, and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME), which oﬀers a
coverage for the years 1994-2003.7 We only keep firms within the manufacturing
industry for which we have at least 4 observations for all variables, ending up
with an unbalanced panel of 9820 firms with the number of observations for
each firm varying between 4 and 14.8
We use turnover deflated by the producer price index at the four- and five-digit
level, according to availability,9 as a proxy for output (Q). Labour (N) refers to
the average number of employees in each firm for each year. Intermediate inputs
(M) are calculated by subtracting the value added from the value of production,
deflated by the two-digit materials and fuel price index. The capital stock (K) is
measured by the gross bookvalue of fixed assets deflated by a price index of net
capital defined at the two-digit level. All deflators are drawn from the UK Oﬃce
for National Statistics (ONS). The input shares (αN and αM ) are computed
by dividing respectively the firm total labour cost and undeflated intermediate
inputs by the value of production and by taking the average of these ratios over
adjacent years. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and first and
third quartiles of our main variables used in the Part I estimation.10
<Insert Table 1 about here>
We split the total sample into 20 two-digit sectors according to the Standard
Industrial Classification 2003.11 Employment coverage of our sample is on av-
erage 60% of total UK manufacturing employment (SIC 15-37). Table A.1 in
Appendix A shows the sector repartition of the sample.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main diﬃculty in estimating the extended Hall-type equation (8) lies in the
potential correlation between the TFP-growth term (∆θ) and the RHS vari-
ables. The problem arises because the productivity shocks are unobserved by
7OneSource is a database of company accounts constructed by OneSource Information
Services Ltd, whilst FAME is gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing and both
derive ultimately from the information which companies are required to deposit at Companies
House. For FAME a maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at
once. For OneSource we used the CD-ROM entitled “UK companies, Vol. 1”, October 2000.
Further details on the OneSource dataset can be found in Oulton (1998).
8In OneSource, the holding companies are reported in addition to their subsidiaries. To
avoid the double accounting, we excluded the holdings.
9The PPI is available at the 5-digit level for the period 1990-2000 and at the 4-digit level
for the period 2001-2003.
10Wemade two rounds of cleaning: the first in order to harmonize OneSource with Fame and
to obtain a unique and coherent dataset, and the second to eliminate outliers and anomalies
in the dataset. Details are available upon request.
11We paid attention to the fact that some firms were recorded in two sectors at diﬀerent
times. To create a one-to-one match between firms and sectors, each firm was attributed to
the most recorded sector. Sectors 16 and 23 have been dropped due to parsimonious data.
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the econometrician but not necessarily by the firms which, at least, might antic-
ipate them before choosing their factor inputs. In this case, OLS estimates are
likely to be biased. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on firm heterogeneity
stresses the diﬀerences in productivity level and growth across firms (Bernard et
al., 2003 for the US and Eaton et al., 2004 for France). As in Harrison (1994),
this problem could be addressed by decomposing the productivity growth term
into a firm and a time fixed eﬀect, the latter capturing possible unobservable
aggregate shocks and productivity shocks common to all firms within sector j,
plus a disturbance term:
uijt =
¡
1− βj
¢
∆θijt = eij + ejt + vijt (9)
However, since inputs and output are simultaneously determined, the fixed-
eﬀects (FE) estimator might still be biased. Taking advantage of the panel
dimension of the data, Eq. (8) can be estimated using the Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) technique. We use the 3- to 5-year lagged values of the
factor inputs n, m and k as instruments.
To estimate Eq. (8), firm-level variables are deflated by a common sector price
index. Output price diﬀerences between firms are hence not taken into account
and show up in the error term. This may give rise to downwardly biased and
inconsistent mark-up estimates if output price diﬀerences between firms within a
sector are endogenous and correlated with the explanatory variables (changes in
factor inputs and factor shares). This problem might arise when firms compete
in an environment with diﬀerentiated products. To address this issue, we can
adopt the solution suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996) which amounts to
adding the growth in sector output as an additional regressor.12 Because we
include time dummies in our estimates run at the sector level, this eﬀect is being
controlled for.
3.3 Comparison of FE and GMM estimates
Table 2 reports the FE and GMM13 estimates for each of the 20 sectors.14 For
the GMM estimates, the parameters of interest (µˆj and bφj , j = 1, ..., 20) are
computed from the two-step estimated values of the reduced-form coeﬃcients
12Theoretically, this solution relies on the assumption that the market power of firms orig-
inates from product diﬀerentiation. Intuitively, in the case of product diﬀerentiation, the
demand for an individual firm’s products is a function of its relative price within the sector.
Relative price diﬀerences can then be expressed in terms of relative output growth diﬀerences
in the sector.
13The GMM estimation was carried out in Stata 9.1 (Roodman, 2005).
14Note that a considerable share of firms generates negative profits in a given year. For
instance, the sum of the shares of variable factors in output exceeds 1 for 21% of the obser-
vations in our sample, which is not uncommon. In this case, Eq. (8) is not symmetrical as
bargaining does not apply to negative profits. In particular, wages cannot be lower than the
marginal revenue of labour. It follows directly that
?
1− αNit − αMit
?
(∆nit −∆kit) in (8)
equals zero when the sum of the variable input shares exceeds one. We also tried to limit the
sample to those observations of which the sum of the variable input factors is lower than 1.05
and found similar results.
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(bβj and bγj respectively). The estimated standard errors (bσ) of the estimated
parameters are computed using the Delta Method (Woolridge, 2002).15
The estimated Lerner index (bβj) is always very significant. The estimated
relative bargaining power of the workers (bγj) is significant for 19 out of the 20
sectors with FE, and this number drops to 10 with GMM. However, average
parameters are very similar, around 0.20 for bβj and 0.70 for bγj , which implies
an average estimated mark-up (µˆj) of 1.25 and an average estimated workers’
bargaining power parameter (bφj) of 0.40 respectively. The latter is above Van
Reenen’s (1996) estimates, lying in the (0.22 - 0.29) range, but is very close to
the UK estimates obtained by Dumont et al. (2006) using a smaller set of firms
and sectors. More specifically, the FE range across sectors is (1.12 - 1.45) for
the estimated mark-up and (0.19 - 0.56) for the estimated workers’ bargaining
power. The GMM specification tests behave well. The overidentification test is
not rejected in all but two sectors. The autocorrelation tests are not rejected
for sixteen sectors.
It is worth noting that the estimated mark-up (µˆj) and the estimated workers’
bargaining power parameter (bφj) are positively correlated across sectors. The
correlation between the two estimated structural parameters is 0.71 for the FE
estimates and 0.53 for the GMM estimates. This is consistent with the findings
of Abowd and Lemieux (1993) that the bargaining power is positively linked to
the size of the rents, and with Dobbelaere (2004) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse
(2008). Boulhol (2008) suggests that, as capital return is determined by the
share of the rents kept by the firms, an arbitrage reasoning based on capital
mobility across sectors can explain this positive correlation.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Table 3 compares the FE and the GMM estimates more synthetically. The
trade-oﬀ between the two should be that GMM reduces the bias (see section
3.2) at the cost of less precise estimates. The results indicate that the GMM
estimates are more dispersed across sectors, even leading to two (insignificant)
negative bargaining power parameters. However, the correlation between the
FE and the GMM estimates is strong and significant. For the estimated Lerner
indexes, the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is close to 0.90 between FE and
GMM. For the estimated relative bargaining power parameters, it reaches 0.57
unweighted and 0.72 when weighted to take into account the precision of the
estimates. All in all, as the average level of the two parameters are very close
with FE and GMM, FE proves to be as eﬃcient as GMM. This comparison
suggests that the year and firm fixed eﬀects do a good job in accounting for
the heterogeneity in productivity growth across firms. Harrison (1994) shows
that her FE and IV estimates are very close and, consequently, sticks to the FE
results as Levinsohn (1993) does. We follow the same route for the remainder
of this study.
15σ?µ =
σ?β
(1−?β)2 ; σ?φ =
σ?γ
(1+?γ)2 .
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<Insert Table 3 about here>
3.4 Variance Analysis
The above estimates should be considered as sectoral average parameters. There
are, however, many reasons to believe that mark-up and bargaining power pa-
rameters vary across time and firm size. What follows confirms this presump-
tion. In addition to the sectoral dimension, the sample is split according to size
and period criteria. For the former, the sample is divided between small firms
(fewer than 75 employees on average), medium-sized firms (between 75 and 200
employees) and large firms (more than 200 employees), which provides three
subsamples of comparable size. For the latter, three subperiods are defined:
1991-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2003.16 This leaves us with 179 estimates for the
mark-up and the bargaining power parameter: 20 sectors x 3 periods x 3 size
classes, minus sector 19, first period, small firms due to lack of data.
Before formally assessing the determinants of the two parameters of interest,
we conduct a variance analysis along the three dimensions presiding over the
splitting of the sample. 17 out of the 179 Part I estimates display a negative
estimated bargaining power and 2 out of the 179 Part I estimates are estimated
to be larger than 1. However, none of these 19 estimates are estimated to be
significant. As a robustness check, the various results are compared with and
without the 19 “outliers”.
As for the estimated mark-ups (see the left part of Table 4), the three di-
mensions (sector, size and period) are very significant at the 99% confidence
level, the sectoral dimension, as expected, accounting for the larger part of the
explained variance. Two findings show up clearly. First, mark-ups drop signif-
icantly and importantly by around 7 percentage points between the first and
the second period. Second, the estimated mark-up is increasing in firm size.
This is consistent with both theory (e.g. Cournot competition) and empirical
evidence in the heterogeneous firm literature. The diﬀerence according to firm
size is especially true between the small firms and the others.
The right part of Table 4 reports the variance analysis for the estimated workers’
bargaining power parameters. The sector share of the explained variance is also
predominant. Similar to the estimated mark-up, the workers’ bargaining power
dropped significantly, by around 0.12, after the first period. This decrease in
the workers’ bargaining power echoes Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) who find
a significant decline in the union wage premium after 1994 for the UK. It is also
consistent with the diluted role of UK labour market institutions, documented
by Machin (1997). In addition to other legislative measures, he draws attention
to the abolition of the Wages Council system of minimum wages in August 1993,
covering 2.5 million workers at that time. Moreover, the workers’ bargaining
power is estimated to be lower, by around 0.05, for the smaller firms. However,
16We start in 1991 to allow for lags.
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this diﬀerence is only significant with the medium-sized firms.17
<Insert Table 4 about here>
4 Part II : Testing the imports-as-product-and-
labour-market-discipline hypothesis
This section concentrates on the identification of the eﬀect of increased import
competition on both the estimated mark-ups and workers’ bargaining power pa-
rameters. Since our dependent variables in the Part II estimations are estimated
in a first step, the first step (or sampling) variance must be taken into account.
Lewis and Linzer (2005) develop a Feasible Generalised Least Squares estimator,
EDV (Estimated Dependent Variable), that, compared to OLS, corrects for both
estimated parameter values and standard errors. Lewis and Linzer show that
EDV is more eﬃcient than estimators that correct for standard errors only.18
In addition, we cluster standard errors at the sector-period level19 to deal with
intra-cluster serial correlation, correlation generated by common shocks, and
all other forms of intra-cluster correlation (Rogers, 1993; Woolridge, 2002). A
description of all variables used in this section and data sources are reported in
Table A.2 in Appendix A. Our main focus is the impact of international trade
on our two parameters of interest.
4.1 Mark-up
4.1.1 Specification
Firms under intensifying pressure from foreign competition are induced to re-
duce their margins because of the increase in the perceived elasticity of the
demand they are facing. This elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties, the concentration level and the intensity of competition.
The following variables are defined. IMPORT is the share of imports in
sectoral demand. Trade theory highlights that the impact of imports is dif-
ferentiated depending on the origin of the imports. For a developed coun-
try like the United Kingdom, trade with developing countries is supposedly
17When we drop the 19 estimated bargaining power parameters that are outside the [0, 1]-
range, we find very similar results.
18Dumont et al. (2005) propose a corrected OLS estimator that provides a procedure to
correct for estimated standard errors only and that is unbiased even in small samples. However,
when the sampling variance is large the loss in eﬃciency compared to EDV could be important.
Besides, Lewis and Linzer (2005) report that their EDV estimated standard errors show little
to no bias even in samples as small as 30 observations. As a check, we nevertheless implemented
the Dumont et al. (2005) procedure, which led to similar inferences to those drawn from the
results presented below. The main diﬀerence refers to the point estimates when the bargaining
power is the dependent variable, which suggests that the sampling variance plays a greater
role in that case.
19Since our key variable of interest, imports, varies at the sector-period level only, we cluster
standard errors at that level (cfr. infra).
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based on comparative advantage and the impact of trade is mainly channelled
through reallocation between sectors. In contrast, trade with developed coun-
tries is mostly intra-industry. It is based on imperfect competition and is
therefore a better candidate for the pro-competitive eﬀect on mark-ups. We
distinguish IMPNORTH, which is the share of imports from Western Eu-
rope, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in total demand, from
IMPSOUTH, its complement. Since firms are likely to select foreign markets
based on the margins they oﬀer for their products, exports could be positively
related to markups. The export ratio at the firm level is EXPFIRM . Ta-
ble A.3 in Appendix A summarises the changes of the import variables over
the period. The absence of correlation between the changes in imports from
developed countries and those from developing countries across sectors is par-
ticularly striking (linear coeﬃcient of -3%), implying that these trends reflect a
very distinct rationale.
When competition intensifies, firms’ reaction is not limited to pricing behaviour.
Sutton (1991, 1998) insists on the endogeneity of market structure. An increase
in the competitive environment may trigger an endogenous reaction of firms,
through an increase in R&D or advertisement spending for instance. This might
force out firms that are unable to keep the pace. R&D could hence be positively
related to mark-ups. R&DRATIO is defined as the share of R&D spending in
total output at the sectoral level.
There is a lack of data to take into account the change in domestic competition
at the sectoral level. At the country level, we test three variables that might
have an impact on mark-ups. PMR is the product market regulation index
computed by the OECD on a scale from 0 to 6, in ascending order of regulation.
The series is available for 1988, 1993, 1998 (Nicoletti et al., 2001) and 2003
(Conway et al., 2005), and is linearly interpolated between these years.20 For
the UK, it has decreased from 3.5 in 1988 to 1.0 in 2003. The second variable is
the (log of) stock market capitalisation as a share of GDP , CAPIT . Hoekman
et al. (2001) argue that financial deepening reduces the cost of capital, thus
increasing the overall profitability of the economy. They provide evidence of
stock market capitalisation exerting a significantly positive impact on average
sector mark-ups. Finally, the Herfindahl index, HERF , is calculated from our
sample. Caution is required using this variable as it is very sensitive to the entry
or exit of big firms in the database at diﬀerent times.
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, an abun-
dant literature deals with the cyclicality of mark-ups. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) provide some detailed theoretical explanations, such as overhead labour,
adjustment costs and labour hoarding, in support of the counter-cyclicality
of mark-ups. The debate whether mark-ups are pro- or counter-cyclical re-
mains unresolved although the empirical evidence rather leans towards counter-
cyclicality. We use the annual change in value-added, and V ALUCY C is the
20The indicator is based on seven non-manufacturing sectors (energy, communication and
transport). It is very correlated (linear coeﬃcient of around 86%) to the regulation index for
the whole economy, only available for 1998 and 2003.
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de-trended series using a Hodrik-Prescott filter. Our empirical specification can
be expressed as:
bµjsp= α1Lag(IMPORT jp) + α2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + αxXjsp+ej+es+ep+ξjsp
(10)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
To account for the endogeneity problem of trade and other variables, all ex-
planatory variables are lagged, except for firm size, the cyclical variable and
the Herfindahl index. We use 3-year lagged values of the endogenous variables.
In order to avoid overlapping between the subperiods, ideally we would need
5-year lags. However, such a long lag is likely to weaken the explanatory power
substantially and we therefore use it as a robustness check only.
Appendix B provides some evidence that the import variable is related to struc-
tural policy measures. In particular, there seems to be a positive relation across
sectors between the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio and the expected im-
pact of the 1992 Single Market Program. This is reassuring because this means
that the trade ratio seems to capture reasonably well the major structural re-
forms that took place at the beginning of the period under study.
4.1.2 Results
The estimates are presented in Table 5. The main result is that imports exert
a negative impact on mark-ups, although this eﬀect is not significant when the
origin of imports is not diﬀerentiated. As column (2) indicates, this is because
only imports from developed countries appear to have a significant eﬀect, which
is consistent with the discussion above. The estimated impact looks strong, as
an increase of one point in the share of imports from the North in total demand
would trigger a decrease of around one point.
Exports never show up as being significant. Consistent with the heterogenous
firm literature, we find that exports increase with firm size, as the export ratio
is on average 0.065 higher for the large compared to the small firms. However,
it seems that the size-eﬀect on mark-ups is not amplified by the export status.
When we substitute the (log of) average employment EMPL to the size dum-
mies or when the sample is restricted to the positive bargaining power obser-
vations, the results are not altered. When time dummies are withdrawn, the
coeﬃcient of the cyclical variable V ALUCY C is negative and significant in two
specifications, hence supporting the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups.
As a robustness check, we use 5-year lags which produce in general qualitatively
similar -although not always significant- results. As an illustration, we report
in the last column the specification consistent with the one in column (2).
<Insert Table 5 about here>
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4.2 Workers’ Bargaining Power
4.2.1 Specification
Formalising the impact of foreign competition on workers’ bargaining strength is
not as straightforward as doing so on mark-ups, even if it is generally reflected
in the increase in the elasticity of labour demand due to imports, for which
Fabbri et al. (2003) provide some evidence for low skilled workers. Rodrik
(1997) points out that imports increase the substitution between domestic and
foreign workers. Moreover, the possibility of oﬀshoring improves the position
of employers in bargaining and at the same time narrows the range of outside
options available to workers. Therefore, pressure from foreign competition could
increase the risk of breakdown in bargaining and loosen labour market tightness,
thereby diminishing workers’ bargaining power (see Brock and Dobbelaere, 2006
and Dumont et al., 2006 for a further discussion). Pencavel (2004) documents
“the surprising retreat of union Britain”. He details the changes in the legal
framework for unionism in the 1980s and 1990s and suggests that the context of
a harsher domestic and international competitive environment determined the
impact of the new laws.
In addition to the variables described in section (4.1.1), we evaluate the eﬀect of
three labour market variables on workers’ bargaining power: UNIONDENS,
REPLRATE and UNEMPRATE, referring to union density, the replacement
rate and the unemployment rate at the country level respectively. Union density
and the replacement rate are expected to be positively related to the workers’
bargaining power, as shown by Karier (1985) and Conyon and Machin (1991).
For the unemployment rate, the link might not be clear-cut. An increase in
the unemployment rate has a negative eﬀect on the outside option, hence a
negative relationship with the workers’ bargaining power is expected. However,
because the union wage premium softens the impact of shocks on wages, Blanch-
flower and Bryson (2004) find that the union wage premium is counter-cyclical,
pointing to a positive relationship. Therefore, the resulting eﬀect is, a priori,
ambiguous.
Product market deregulation (PMR) has been found to be positively correlated
to labour market deregulation across countries and seems to precede labour mar-
ket reforms (see Fig. 34 in Brandt et al., 2005). If capital deepening (CAPIT )
is linked to increased capital mobility, it might have a negative impact on the
workers’ bargaining power. Finally, it is often argued that technological change,
instead of international trade, triggers changes in the labour market (see e.g.
Berman et al., 1994; Krugman and Lawrence, 1996). Technological change
(R&DRATIO) might exert an eﬀect on the workers’ bargaining power by im-
pacting the nature of the production process. However, this eﬀect is, a priori,
unclear. As discussed in Betcherman (1991), it depends on the importance of
labour costs in the firm’s total costs and on the workers’ essentiality in the
production process.
Finally concentration (HERF ) can have two opposite eﬀects on the bargain-
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ing power. On the one hand, in concentrated sectors, firms may tend to have
monopsony power in the labour market which weakens the workers’ bargaining
power. On the other hand, as argued by Veugelers (1989), output concentration
may allow firms to shift costs on to customers more easily and accept stronger
unions. Ebell and Haefke (2006) find a positive correlation between concentra-
tion and union coverage in a cross-section of US sectors.
To test the imports-as-labour-market discipline hypothesis, we estimate the fol-
lowing specification:
bφjsp= α1Lag(IMPORT jp) + α2Lag(EXPFIRM jsp) + αxXjsp+ej+es+ep+ξjsp
(11)
with j, s and p indexing sector, size and period, respectively.
4.2.2 Results
Our results, which are reported in Table 6, provide robust evidence of imports
from developed countries having squeezed the workers’ bargaining power. Total
imports is also significant but this is only due to the eﬀect of imports from
developed countries. An increase of one point in the share of imports from the
North seems to have reduced the bargaining power by 0.008 on average.21 The
fact that only increased import competition from the North exerts a signifi-
cantly negative impact might seem surprising at first sight. However, one would
need to rely on a more detailed skill structure within sectors to have a clearer
analysis. Our results seem to point out that, because of similar characteris-
tics in terms of education, productivity and skills, foreign workers in developed
countries are more substitutable through imports to UK workers than those
in developing countries. Interestingly, Neven and Wyplosz (1999) find similar
eﬀects. Also, Greenaway et al. (1999) study the impact of international trade
on UK employment between 1979 and 1991. They find that only imports from
developed countries had a negative impact, which is even more surprising, and
suggest that the competition from developing countries is in sectors that had
already declined in the 1970s.
The coeﬃcient on EXPFIRM is positive and significant at 10% in three spec-
ifications. Because most of the other explanatory variables lack the sectoral
dimension, we run into severe multicollinearity issues. This makes it almost
impossible to disentangle the eﬀect of these country variables. Therefore, we
test each of them separately, keeping in mind that the contribution of each
variable should not be cumulated. The impact of UNIONDENS, PMR,
REPLRATE, CAPIT and UNEMPRATE show up significantly. The first
two variables have the highest explanatory power. Deunionisation seems to be
associated with a decline in the workers’ bargaining power between 1991 and
2003. Product market and labour market deregulation are found to go hand
21Considering 5 EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK), Dumont et
al. (2006) find a comparable eﬀect.
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in hand. A higher unemployment rate, a lower replacement rate and financial
deepening seem negatively related to the workers’ bargaining power. Finally,
the workers’ bargaining power is found to be significantly higher in concentrated
sectors whereas no significant relationship is detected with R&D.22
<Insert Table 6 about here>
4.3 Exporters versus non-exporters
To test whether the competitive eﬀect of imports is dependent on the export
behaviour of firms, we subdivided the original sample into exporting and do-
mestically oriented firms (labelled non-exporters hereafter). The subsample of
exporters consists of those firms for which we have data on exporting activity
for each year. Based on this criterion, 41% of the firms belong to the subsam-
ple of exporting firms. Each of the two subsamples is split according to the
same sector, size and period criteria as in section 3.4. Due to the constraint
that each “sector-size-period subsample” should contain at least 30 observa-
tions, we are able to obtain 161 estimates of Eq. (8) -controlling for year and
firm eﬀects- for the subsample of exporters and 174 estimates for the subsample
of non-exporters. Both subsamples have 159 “sector-size-period subsamples” in
common. For reasons of comparability, we focus on these 159 estimates in the
discussion below. Table A.5 in Appendix A summarises the mean and quartile
values of the estimated reduced-form coeﬃcients for respectively the subsample
of exporters, the subsample of non-exporters and the total sample. To take
into account the precision of the estimates, we weight each estimate by the in-
verse of the sampling variance. From Table A.6, it follows that the estimated
reduced-form coeﬃcients (bβjsp and γˆjsp) do not diﬀer significantly between the
subsample of exporters and the subsample of non-exporters.
To check whether the competitive eﬀect varies according to the export status of
firms, we re-estimated specification (2) of Tables 5 and 6 for the subsample of
exporters, the subsample of non-exporters and the total sample (see Table 7).23
22As a robustness check, limiting ourselves to the 160 bargaining power Part I esti-
mates lying in the [0, 1]-interval produces similar results. Also, we used a logit transfor-
mation. The results are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix A. As can be seen, the or-
ders of magnitude are comparable but the the logit specification leads to less significant
estimates. When the bargaining power is the dependent variable, the average parameter
on IMPNORTH is around −0.80, i.e. ∆φ ≈ −0.80∆IMPNORTH. With the logit
specification, the average IMPNORTH parameter is around −3.0 from which we infer:
∆ ln
?
φ
1−φ
?
≈ −3.0∆IMPNORTH ⇐⇒ ∆φ ≈ −3.0φ (1− φ) ∆IMPNORTH. The av-
erage estimated bargaining power is around 0.40 (Table 2), hence an average sensitivity of
−3 ∗ 0.4 ∗ 0.6 = −0.72. Of course, from the logit specification the implied sensitivity to
IMPNORTH depends on the level of the bargaining power. One can calculate that this
sensitivity is equal to −0.27 when the bargaining power is 0.10 and −0.63 when it is 0.70.
23In order not to lose any information, we used all available “Part I” estimates of µˆjsp and
?φjsp for each (sub)sample resulting in a diﬀerent number of observations for each (sub)sample
whereas in Table A.5 in Appendix A, we only used the estimates of the common “sector-size-
period subsamples” to ensure comparability.
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From Table 7, it follows that imports from developed countries exert a statis-
tically significant negative eﬀect on both the estimated mark-up and workers’
bargaining power of exporting as well as non-exporting firms. Moreover, the
size of the eﬀect does not depend on the export status.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
4.4 Product market versus labour market discipline and
the price-cost margin puzzle
What is the significance of both the mark-up and the bargaining power sen-
sitivities to imports in relation to the overall findings in graph 1 highlighting
that price-cost margins are about the same? Based on the model in section
2, the price-cost margin, PCM , is derived from equation (7) which -dropping
subscripts- is rewritten as:
αN + αM =
³
1− εQK
´
(1− φ)
µ
+ φ
=⇒ PCM ≡ 1− αN − αM =
Ã
1− 1− ε
Q
K
µ
!
(1− φ) (12)
Diﬀerentiation of Eq. (12) implies:
∆PCM
PCM
=
(1−εQK)
µ
1− (1−ε
Q
K)
µ
∆µ
µ
− ∆φ
1− φ
Using the expression of
(1−εQK)
µ implied by Eq. (12) leads to:
∆PCM = 1− φ− PCM
µ
∆µ − PCM
1− φ ∆φ
Focusing on the eﬀect of imports, the impact on the price-cost margin can be
broken down in two components, the product-market-discipline eﬀect and the
labour-market-discipline eﬀect:
∂PCM
∂IMPNORTH
=
1− φ− PCM
µ
∂µ
∂IMPNORTH
− PCM
1− φ
∂φ
∂IMPNORTH
Based on the average estimates in Table 2 and Graph 1 (µ = 1.25, φ = 0.40,
PCM = 0.14), the order of magnitude of the impact of imports from developed
countries on the price-cost margin is given by:
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∂PCM
∂IMPNORTH
= 0.37 ∂µ
∂IMPNORTH
− 0.23 ∂φ
∂IMPNORTH
The average estimates in Tables 5 and 6 give ∂µ∂IMPNORTH ≈ −1.0 and
∂φ
∂IMPNORTH ≈
−0.8, which leads to the following break-down:
∆PCM = product-markt-discipline eﬀect + labour-market-discipline eﬀect
= − 0.37∆IMPNORTH + 0.19∆IMPNORTH
This back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that firstly, the labour-market
discipline eﬀect might have counteracted half of the product-market discipline
eﬀect and secondly, that import competition has contributed to a decline in the
price-cost margin of around 1 point on average over the period.24 The puzzle is
therefore only partially resolved.
5 Conclusion
Many empirical studies have provided evidence that trade has a pro-competitive
eﬀect by reducing mark-ups to marginal cost in import competing sectors. Most
of them have focused on developing countries assuming a perfectly competitive
labour market. In contrast, this study concentrates on a developed country
and takes into account labour market imperfections, using firm-level data for
UK manufacturing sectors. Our results indicate that both the mark-ups and
workers’ bargaining power decreased in the mid-nineties. Moreover, imports
from developed countries are shown to contribute significantly to these changes,
whereas firm exports have a weakly significant positive influence on the workers’
bargaining power. These joint eﬀects imply that trade has exerted a conflicting
impact on price-cost margins, i.e. on the share of the rents kept by the firms.
Based on the estimates, the labour-market-discipline eﬀect might have coun-
teracted half of the product-market-discipline eﬀect. We also find, consistent
with the recent literature on firm heterogeneity, that small firms have lower
mark-ups. Additionally, their workers are subject to a lower bargaining power.
24Based on Table A.3 in Appendix A, IMPNORTH has increased by 6 points on average
over the total period and (−0.37 + 0.19) 0.06 ≈ −0.01.
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Appendix A: Statistical annex
Table A.1
Sector repartition of the sample
Code Name
15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles
18 Wearing apparel, dressing, dying of fur
19 Leather, leather products and footwear
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper and paper products
22 Printing and publishing
24 Chemicals and chemical products
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 Oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Other transport equipment
36 Manufacturing, n.e.c.
Table A.2
Description and source of variables in Part II regressions
Variable Description Source
CAPIT
Log of stock market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP
Datastream
EMPL
Log of firm average employment level
across the whole period
OneSource, FAME
EXPFIRM Firm exports/turnover ratio OneSource, FAME
HERF Sample-based Herfindahl index OneSource, FAME
IMPORT
Sectoral import penetration ratio:
imports/(imports+production-exports)
STAN
IMPNORTH
IMPORT from Western Europe, North America,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand
Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
IMPSOUTH Complement of IMPNORTH Bilateral Trade Database (OECD)
PMR Product market regulation index Nicoletti et al. (2001), Conway et al. (2005)
R&DRATIO Sectoral share of R&D expenses in total output OECD
UNEMPRATE Country-level unemployment rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
UNIONDENS Manufacturing-level union density Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
REPLRATE Manufacturing-level replacement rate Nickell and Nunziata (2001)
VALUCYC De-trended sectoral annual change in value added STAN
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Table A.3
Summary statistics for the import variables
IMPNORTH IMPSOUTH
Change in
IMPNORTH
Change in
IMPSOUTH
Sector 1988 1994 2000 1988 1994 2000 1988/2000 1988/2000
15 0.117 0.123 0.139 0.056 0.067 0.069 0.022 0.014
17 0.201 0.210 0.194 0.166 0.253 0.345 -0.008 0.179
18 0.201 0.210 0.234 0.166 0.254 0.417 0.033 0.251
19 0.215 0.260 0.303 0.178 0.314 0.539 0.088 0.361
20 0.218 0.206 0.188 0.105 0.110 0.127 -0.030 0.022
21 0.312 0.285 0.291 0.042 0.055 0.067 -0.022 0.024
22 0.062 0.067 0.065 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.002 0.006
24 0.258 0.334 0.403 0.085 0.108 0.137 0.145 0.052
25 0.183 0.182 0.181 0.050 0.064 0.083 -0.003 0.034
26 0.115 0.115 0.123 0.037 0.044 0.057 0.008 0.021
27 0.195 0.275 0.314 0.248 0.173 0.156 0.119 -0.092
28 0.106 0.101 0.115 0.028 0.036 0.053 0.009 0.024
29 0.390 0.401 0.455 0.078 0.078 0.114 0.065 0.036
30 0.672 0.684 0.660 0.138 0.192 0.406 -0.012 0.268
31 0.235 0.312 0.377 0.072 0.106 0.188 0.143 0.116
32 0.372 0.465 0.590 0.147 0.261 0.311 0.218 0.164
33 0.412 0.419 0.493 0.098 0.117 0.138 0.081 0.040
34 0.379 0.409 0.489 0.073 0.101 0.128 0.110 0.054
35 0.153 0.148 0.365 0.371 0.353 0.349 0.213 -0.022
36 0.178 0.166 0.195 0.147 0.177 0.184 0.017 0.037
Unweighted
average
0.249 0.269 0.309 0.115 0.144 0.194 0.060 0.079
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Table A.4
Determinants of the estimated workers’ bargaining power, dependent variable ln(
?φjsp
1−?φjsp
)
Variables (1)
a
(2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
a
(5)
a
(6)
a
(7)
a
(8)
b
(9)
b
(10)
b
1995-1998
-0.412∗∗∗
(0.0861)
-0.406∗∗∗
(0.089)
-0.419∗∗∗
(0.095)
1999-2003
-0.368∗∗∗
(0.112)
-0.375∗∗∗
(0.112)
-0.409∗∗∗
(0.118)
Medium-sized
0.145
(0.106)
0.141
(0.105)
0.131
(0.107)
0.163
(0.107)
Large
0.024
(0.109)
0.021
(0.109)
0.001
(0.111)
0.066
(0.109)
EMPL
-0.019
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.026)
-0.011
(0.026)
-0.005
(0.026)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.731
(0.855)
0.838
(0.886)
1.021
(0.909)
0.989
(0.911)
0.593
(0.887)
0.899
(0.899)
0.885
(0.898)
0.989
(0.879)
0.529
(0.850)
0.632
(0.868)
lag(IMPORT)
-2.163∗∗
(0.868)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-3.061∗∗
(1.469)
-2.516
(1.683)
-2.586
(1.742)
-5.461∗∗∗
(1.447)
-3.191∗
(1.893)
-3.261∗
(1.905)
-0.707
(1.773)
-1.764
(1.655)
-1.988
(1.668)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
-0.458
(1.398)
-0.024
(1.547)
-0.161
(1.619)
-3.150∗
(1.652)
-0.960
(1.843)
-1.060
(1.860)
-1.803
(1.858)
-6.268∗∗∗
(2.252)
-6.166∗∗
(2.467)
lag(R&DRATIO)
-10.446
(7.720)
-7.752
(7.480)
-7.554
(8.802)
-7.964
(9.136)
-11.431
(7.796)
-9.749
(10.101)
-9.962
(10.159)
-3.896
(7.909)
-12.008
(10.275)
-11.926
(10.720)
lag(PMR)
0.245∗∗∗
(0.065)
lag(UNIONDENS)
4.675∗∗∗
(1.310)
lag(UNEMPRATE)
-8.277∗∗∗
(2.826)
REPLRATE
12.321∗∗∗
(4.418)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.373∗∗∗
(0.138)
HERF
0.982∗
(0.686)
1.377∗
(0.804)
1.426∗
(0.848)
1.014
(0.906)
1.532
(0.988)
1.537
(0.937)
1.216
(0.735)
1.852
(1.242)
1.932
(1.224)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.560 0.561 0.534 0.527 0.511 0.501 0.499 0.553 0.472 0.462
#Obs. 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
The dependent variable (ln(
φˆjsp
1−φˆjsp
) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and
clustered at the sector-period level. ∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except for EXPFIRM .
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Table A.5
Weighteda mean and quartile values of the reduced-form coeﬃcients βˆjsp and γˆjsp
Exporters, non-exporters and total sample
YEAR AND FIRM FIXED EFFECTS
159 ssp estimatesb bβjsp bγjsp
Exporters
ssp mean 0.210 (0.077) 0.827 (0.993)
ssp Q1 0.157 0.194
ssp median 0.202 0.757
ssp Q3 0.252 1.390
Non-exporters
ssp mean 0.203 (0.075) 0.774 (0.838)
ssp Q1 0.155 0.170
ssp median 0.194 0.681
ssp Q3 0.231 1.162
Total sample
ssp mean 0.206 (0.069) 0.790 (0.606)
ssp Q1 0.171 0.219
ssp median 0.197 0.726
ssp Q3 0.227 1.230
a Each estimate is weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance.
b “ssp” denotes sector-size-period.
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Appendix B: 1992 Single Market Program
In order to address the endogeneity issue related to the trade variables, some
empirical studies (e.g. Botasso and Sembenelli, 2001; Griﬃth, 2001) have used
a criterion suggested by the European Commission. Sectors were grouped ac-
cording to the level of non-tariﬀ barriers that the 1992 Single Market Program
(SMP) was expected to reduce. Based on this criterion, sectors were classi-
fied as having a high, moderate or low sensitivity to the SMP (Buigues et al.,
1990). Out of 120 NACE three-digit manufacturing sectors, 14 were classified as
highly sensitive and 26 as moderately sensitive to the SMP. There is one major
diﬃculty in applying such a strategy here. In order to identify the structural
parameters of interest, the mark-up and bargaining power, the level of aggrega-
tion is two-digit and, for a given two-digit sector, the corresponding three-digit
components generally fall in diﬀerent sensitivity categories.
However, even though the match is far from perfect, the two-digit sectors were
tentatively classified according to their sensitivity level, as displayed in Table
B.1. Sectors are ranked based on the changes in the IMPNORTH ratio in
column 2. Column 3 reports the apparent break in the series based on Graph
B.1, i.e. the year where imports from developed countries have accelerated. The
average increase in IMPNORTH, which is reported in Table A.3 in Appendix
A, is entirely explained by 9 out of the 20 sectors, 7 of which saw an acceler-
ation in IMPNORTH just after the completion of the SMP. Moreover, the
sensitivity to the SMP reported in the fourth column of Table B.1 indicates that
there is a fairly clear relation between the increase in imports from developed
countries and the expected sensitivity to the SMP. This is reassuring because
this means that the trade ratio seems to capture reasonably well the major
structural reforms that took place at the beginning of the period under study.
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Table B.1
Changes in imports from developed countries and sensitivity to the 1992 Single Market Program
Sector
Change in
IMPNORTH
between 1988-2000
Apparent break in the
IMPNORTH series
Tentative
two-digit sensitivity
based on Griﬃth (2001)
Comments
32 +0.22 1993 high
35 +0.21 1995 high/medium
Shipbuilding, Railway and tramway are classified as
highly sensitive, while aerospace equipment falls in the medium category.
The latter explains most of the increase in import penetration.
24 +0.15 1993 high/low
Specialised chemical and pharmaceutical products had
had high NTBs and account for more of the increase in IMPNORTH.
31 +0.14 1994 medium
27 +0.12 1988? low Most of the increase seems to be due to the surprising 1988 trough in the series.
34 +0.11 gradual medium
19 +0.09 1994 medium/low
33 +0.08 1994 high
29 +0.06 1994 medium/high
18 +0.03 medium/low
15 +0.02 low
36 +0.02 high
28 +0.01 low
26 +0.01 low
22 +0.00 low
25 -0.00 low
17 -0.01 low
30 -0.01 high Foreign competition based on the import ratio was already intense before the SMP.
21 -0.02 low
20 -0.03 low
24
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Graph B.1 
Share of UK imports from developed countries in sectoral demand, 
two-digit manufacturing sectors, OECD database 
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Graph 1 
Price-cost margins for large UK manufacturing sectors (description in A.1 in Appendix A) 
1970-2003, STAN database 
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Variables 1990-2003
Mean Sd. Q1 Q3
Real firm output growth rate ∆q 0.014 0.166 -0.081 0.107
Labour growth rate ∆n 0.003 0.129 -0.061 0.062
Capital growth rate ∆k 0.006 0.178 -0.090 0.088
Intermediate inputs growth rate ∆m 0.029 0.189 -0.084 0.138
Share of labour in nominal output αN 0.287 0.130 0.192 0.369
Share of intermediate inputs in nominal output αM 0.656 0.137 0.567 0.752
Solow residual SRa 0.0008 0.079 -0.037 0.037
∆q −∆k 0.007 0.219 -0.116 0.137
(αN + αM − 1) (∆n−∆k) 0.0002 0.019 -0.005 0.005
Number of observations: 60579.
a SR = ∆q − αN∆n− αM∆m− (1− αN − αM )∆k.
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Table 2
Sector analysis: Estimated sector-level mark-up µˆj and workers’ bargaining power φˆj , FE and GMM results
YEAR AND FIRM FIXED EFFECTS GMM
Code
# Obs.
(# Firms)
βˆj µˆj = 11−?βj bγj φˆj = ?γj1+?γj βˆj µˆj = 11−?βj bγj φˆj = ?γj1+?γj Sargan m1 m2
15 3893 (787) 0.195∗∗∗ (0.008) 1.242∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.670∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.401∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.350 (0.441) 0.259 (0.242) 0.153 0.000 0.189
17 1957 (377) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.010) 1.216∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.137∗∗∗ (0.165) 0.532∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.267∗∗∗ (0.059) 1.679∗∗∗ (0.543) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.547 0.000 0.025
18 834 (192) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.124∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.420∗ (0.254) 0.296∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.027) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.036) 0.022 (0.711) 0.022 (0.681) 0.999 0.000 0.233
19 432 (74) 0.103∗∗∗ (0.019) 1.115∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.238 (0.371) 0.192 (0.242) 0.101∗∗∗ (0.036) 1.112∗∗∗ (0.045) 1.272∗ (0.680) 0.560∗∗∗ (0.132) 1.000 0.000 0.309
20 948 (213) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.170∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.597∗∗ (0.268) 0.374∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.076∗∗∗ (0.021) 1.082∗∗∗ (0.246) -0.302 (1.840) -0.433 (3.777) 1.000 0.000 0.415
21 1565 (306) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.013) 1.246∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.841∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.213∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.271∗∗∗ (0.060) 1.155∗∗∗ (0.274) 0.536∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.487 0.000 0.498
22 4824 (1120) 0.187∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.230∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.196∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.035) 1.236∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.316 (0.287) 0.240 (0.166) 0.117 0.000 0.079
24 4061 (781) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.308∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.821∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.451∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.038) 1.264∗∗∗ (0.051) 1.171∗∗ (0.460) 0.539∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.030 0.000 0.187
25 3194 (612) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.250∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.455∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.313∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.269∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.066 (0.358) 0.062 (0.315) 0.245 0.000 0.125
26 1607 (305) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.309∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.978∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.494∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.253∗∗∗ (0.056) 1.339∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.552 (0.476) 0.356∗ (0.198) 0.502 0.000 0.672
27 1779 (337) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.011) 1.329∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.192) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.064) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 1.385∗∗ (0.566) 0.581∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.373 0.000 0.213
28 5061 (1115) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.007) 1.235∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.306∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.034) 1.212∗∗∗ (0.050) -0.231 (0.264) -0.300 (0.446) 0.075 0.000 0.017
29 5417 (1101) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.006) 1.247∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.829∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.453∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.290∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.869∗ (0.507) 0.465∗∗∗ (0.145) 0.105 0.000 0.039
30 563 (142) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.018) 1.219∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.523∗∗∗ (0.202) 0.344∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.037) 1.189∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.179 (0.251) 0.152 (0.181) 1.000 0.001 0.353
31 2181 (475) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.375∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.228∗∗∗ (0.147) 0.551∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.318∗∗∗ (0.043) 1.466∗∗∗ (0.092) 1.046∗∗ (0.451) 0.511∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.729 0.000 0.170
32 1393 (325) 0.309∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.448∗∗∗ (0.032) 1.289∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.563∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.390∗∗∗ (0.041) 1.639∗∗∗ (0.110) 1.316∗∗∗ (0.467) 0.568∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.707 0.000 0.611
33 2155 (478) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.285∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.637∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.389∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.033) 1.266∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.252 (0.488) 0.201 (0.311) 0.821 0.000 0.020
34 1682 (320) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.239∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.807∗∗∗ (0.223) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.269∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.368∗∗∗ (0.049) 1.526∗∗∗ (0.486) 0.604∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.650 0.000 0.301
35 847 (205) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.306∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.951∗∗∗ (0.188) 0.488∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.230∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.299∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.807∗∗ (0.368) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.113) 1.000 0.000 0.302
36 2468 (555) 0.173∗∗∗ (0.009) 1.210∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.136) 0.385∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.031) 1.211∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.265 (0.414) 0.209 (0.259) 0.377 0.000 0.971
Sector average 0.197 (0.012) 1.250 (0.018) 0.723 (0.172) 0.403 (0.065) 0.208 (0.044) 1.272 (0.068) 0.685 (0.517) 0.310 (0.378)
SRit = ∆qit − αNit∆nit − αMit∆mit − (1− αNit − αMit)∆kit
= β (∆qit −∆kit)− γ (1− αNit − αMit) (∆nit −∆kit) + (1− β)∆θit
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%.
Time dummies are included but not reported. FE: robust standard errors in parentheses.
GMM: robust standard errors with finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005).
Sargan: test of overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimator, asymptotically distributed as χ2df . p-values are reported.
m1 and m2: tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-diﬀerenced residuals for the GMM estimator,
asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1). p-values are reported.
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Table 3
Correlation between FE and GMM estimates
Correlation FE-GMM
Mean Sd. Min Max Unweighted Weight 1 Weight 2bβj FE 0.197 0.048 0.103 0.309 0.89∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
GMM 0.208 0.069 0.076 0.390bγj FE 0.723 0.298 0.238 1.289 0.57∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
GMM 0.685 0.611 -0.302 1.679
Weight 1: 1?σ2FE
, weight 2: 1?σFE?σGMM
Table 4
Variance analysis
Mark-up µˆjsp Barg. power bφjsp
PERIOD (ref: 1991-1994)
1995-1998
-0.070∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.120∗∗∗
(0.021)
1999-2003
-0.067∗∗
(0.025)
-0.126∗∗∗
(0.022)
SIZE (ref: small firms)
Medium-sized
0.050∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.055∗∗
(0.025)
Large
0.055∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.029
(0.026)
Adj. R2 0.283 0.573
# Obs. 179 179
SHARE OF EXPL. VARIANCE
Sector 73%∗∗∗ 71%∗∗∗
Period 11%∗∗∗ 26%∗∗∗
Size 16%∗∗∗ 3%∗∗
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, they have been
corrected to account for the generated regressand problem
following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and clustered at the sector-period level.
∗∗∗ Significant at 1%; ∗∗ Significant at 5%; ∗ Significant at 10%.
34
Table 5
Determinants of estimated price-cost mark-up µˆjsp
Variables (1)a (2)a (3)a (4)a (5)a (6)a (7)b
1995-1998
-0.044
(0.027)
-0.060∗∗
(0.025)
-0.060∗∗
(0.025)
-0.075∗∗∗
(0.026)
1999-2003
-0.032
(0.026)
-0.027
(0.023)
-0.025
(0.022)
-0.045∗∗
(0.014)
Medium-sized
0.045∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.045∗∗∗
(0.014)
Large
0.049∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.053∗∗∗
(0.017)
EMPL
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
VALUCYC
-0.123
(0.272)
0.019
(0.255)
0.013
(0.252)
-0.310
(0.186)
-0.362∗
(0.189)
-0.328∗
(0.194)
0.025
(0.268)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.062
(0.178)
0.001
(0.178)
-0.021
(0.174)
-0.016
(0.171)
-0.019
(0.171)
-0.008
(0.173)
-0.035
(0.181)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.272
(0.427)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-1.133∗∗
(0.522)
-1.161∗∗
(0.511)
-0.849∗
(0.482)
-0.934∗
(0.523)
-0.890
(0.550)
-1.492∗∗∗
(0.523)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.241
(0.339)
0.245
(0.328)
0.307
(0.307)
0.202
(0.325)
0.310
(0.307)
0.794∗
(0.368)
lag(R&DRATIO)
4.523
(3.372)
3.971
(2.797)
4.055
(2.747)
3.990
(2.871)
3.934
(2.935)
3.818
(3.272)
2.645
(2.487)
lag(PMR)
0.017
(0.013)
0.018
(0.013)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.018
(0.028)
HERF
-0.068
(0.259)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.302 0.340 0.338 0.324 0.318 0.320 0.340
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
The dependent variable (price-cost mark-up) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and
clustered at the sector-period level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except for EXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability
in the first sub-period.
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Table 6
Determinants of the estimated workers’ bargaining power bφjsp
Variables (1)
a
(2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
a
(5)
a
(6)
a
(7)
a
(8)
b
(9)
b
(10)
b
1995-1998
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.021)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.023)
1999-2003
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.119∗∗∗
(0.029)
Medium-sized
0.049∗
(0.026)
0.048∗
(0.026)
0.045∗
(0.026)
0.061∗∗
(0.026)
Large
0.015
(0.029)
0.016
(0.029)
0.011
(0.029)
0.036
(0.028)
EMPL
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.0005
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.284
(0.194)
0.297
(0.203)
0.378∗
(0.212)
0.370∗
(0.214)
0.235
(0.209)
0.348
(0.216)
0.344
(0.216)
0.343∗
(0.200)
0.200
(0.200)
0.256
(0.207)
lag(IMPORT)
-0.376∗∗
(0.181)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-0.850∗∗
(0.323)
-0.655∗
(0.349)
-0.665∗
(0.365)
-1.539∗∗∗
(0.333)
-0.817∗∗
(0.408)
-0.836∗
(0.411)
-0.476
(0.488)
-0.935∗
(0.524)
-1.020∗∗
(0.510)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
0.211
(0.285)
0.327
(0.288)
0.303
(0.304)
-0.416
(0.364)
0.140
(0.367)
0.117
(0.372)
0.189
(0.437)
-0.768
(0.537)
-0.733
(0.603)
lag(R&DRATIO)
-2.041
(1.696)
-1.688
(1.508)
-1.305
(1.644)
-1.359
(1.728)
-2.040
(1.695)
-1.612
(2.018)
-1.653
(2.040)
-0.107
(1.779)
-1.517
(2.544)
-1.481
(2.639)
lag(PMR)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.016)
lag(UNIONDENS)
1.384∗∗∗
(0.320)
lag(UNEMPRATE)
-2.281∗∗∗
(0.676)
REPLRATE
3.795∗∗∗
(1.116)
lag(CAPIT)
-0.115∗∗∗
(0.035)
HERF
0.274∗
(0.148)
0.390∗∗
(0.170)
0.408∗∗
(0.182)
0.292
(0.206)
0.449∗∗
(0.219)
0.451∗∗
(0.222)
0.321∗∗
(0.158)
0.501∗
(0.290)
0.536∗
(0.288)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.576 0.581 0.553 0.546 0.525 0.521 0.519 0.573 0.492 0.473
#Obs. 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
The dependent variable (workers’ bargaining power) is taken from the Part I estimation. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem following Lewis and Linzer (2005)
and clustered at the sector-period level..
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 3-year lags used.
b 5-year lags used except forEXPFIRM . For this variable, we are forced to take 3-year lags because of data availability in the first subperiod.
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Table 7
Determinants of estimated price-cost mark-up µˆjsp and bφjsp
Exporters, non-exporters and total sample
µˆjsp bφjsp
Exporters Non-exportersa Total sample Exporters Non-exportersa Total sample
Variables (2)
b
(2)
b
(2)
b
(2)
b
(2)
b
(2)
b
1995-1998
-0.080∗∗
(0.031)
-0.067∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.060∗∗
(0.025)
-0.136∗∗∗
(0.020)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.021)
1999-2003
-0.023
(0.030)
-0.019
(0.024)
-0.028
(0.023)
-0.134∗∗∗
(0.031)
-0.107∗∗∗
(0.029)
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
Medium-sized
0.049∗∗
(0.021)
0.045∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.040
(0.034)
0.051∗
(0.028)
0.048∗
(0.026)
Large
0.043∗
(0.022)
0.052∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.051∗∗∗
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.034)
0.017
(0.030)
0.016
(0.029)
VALUCYC
0.471
(0.287)
0.088
(0.264)
0.019
(0.256)
lag(EXPFIRM)
0.132
(0.237)
-0.0000
(0.182)
0.001
(0.178)
0.147
(0.226)
0.299
(0.213)
0.297
(0.203)
lag(IMPNORTH)
-1.327∗∗
(0.551)
-1.395∗∗
(0.544)
-1.133∗∗
(0.522)
-0.822∗
(0.479)
-0.839∗∗
(0.331)
-0.850∗∗
(0.323)
lag(IMPSOUTH)
-0.288
(0.412)
-0.098
(0.360)
0.240
(0.339)
-0.069
(0.364)
0.145
(0.385)
0.211
(0.285)
lag(R&DRATIO)
2.754
(2.791)
3.161
(2.899)
3.972
(2.795)
-5.205∗∗∗
(1.445)
-1.844
(1.851)
-1.688
(1.508)
HERF
0.285∗
(0.160)
0.285∗
(0.153)
0.274∗
(0.148)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.274 0.343 0.340 0.570 0.574 0.582
#Obs. 161 174 179 161 174 179
The dependent variable (price-cost mark-up or workers’ bargaining power) is taken from the Part I estimation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, they have been corrected to account for the generated regressand problem
following Lewis and Linzer (2005) and clustered at the sector-period level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
a 41% of the firms belong to the subsample of exporters. Within the subsample of non-exporters, 28% of them report export activity
for at least one year but not for each year.
b This number refers to specification (2) in Tables 5 and 6.
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